• INTRODUCTION
Feminist ethics is a relatively new arrival on the philosophical scene. Thinking about the significance of gender in our conduct and institutions i hardly new, but it is only fairly recently that philosophers in large numbers have begun to Incorporate such thinking into their investiga ti ons of the nature of ethics.
On hearing that such a thing as "feminist eth ics" exists, people are oftenand understandably-puzzled as to what sort of enterprise it could be. After all , they think, ethics is ethics, and whatever ethical theories and standards turn out to be most rationally defensible, they will presumably be so for everyone alike. Are feminist ethicists suggesting that some different eth ical standard or ideal exists for women-or for feminists?
Th is puzzlement is entirely reasonable and the issue it raises absolutely central. In my view, the core of feminism as an ethical and political position is the endorsement of a single standard of human freedom and dignity for everyone, regardless of gender.
1 To make this standard a social reality, howeverInstead of just a nice idea that we carry around in our heads-we must come to understand wha t kinds of systems and behaviors undermine it and what theories and assumptions support and underlie those systems and behaviors. We need a SUbstantive standard of human freedom and dignity, a clear view of what stands ?~tween it and us, and a conception of what is required to bring us closer to realIZll1g it. In a world still rigidly structured by gender discrimination, this requires both a feminist analysis of society and an approach to ethical philosophy that takes seriously the influences of gender bias.
This chapter begins with a description of the core tenets of feminism along with some brief support for the most controversial of these. I'll then explain how a male gender bias has pervaded much of philosophical ethics and summerize two different (although related) approaches to remedying that bias:
(eminine ethics and feminist ethics. I will argue that feminine ethics alone is ll1adequate to the task described above, and that feminist ethics incorporates 127 1 f I: " I ' h'l ' 1" t' perilous the importa nt insig ltS 0 lemmme ehlcs w I e avOiC Illg Its some Im es deficiencies,
• WHAT IS FEMINISM?
Alth ough con temporary fem inism is diverse and many faceted, it is nonethel es } possible to characterize briefly its core tenets, You may well find one or more °d these claims con troversial; my aim just now, however, is not so much to defen their h'uth as to clarify what is being sa id, which is often, as here, the first concern of philosophers,
• Core Tenets of Feminism
Feminism begins with the claim that:
1, Women and men are rational and moral equals, With respect to the basic rational and moral capacities that defin e personho~d, neither gender is naturally or inherently inferior to the other. To endorse cla l ]l1 1 does not require denying that there are differences between men and WOIll~;~ with respect to th eir predom inant psychological traits and dispositions; as we WI _ see, feminists differ about the existence and extent of such gender-based differ I ' I b ' The ences and, per laps more Important y, a out their origins and their meanIngs,
I
import of claim 1 is that, however alike or different, men and women are equ a in human dignity and worth and as such are entitled to equal concern and respect, Such equal concern and respect requires granting to both men and wOIllen a full and equal complerr~ent of rights, To ensure equal social and civil sta~~~ t~ese rights must be effectIve, that IS, actually respected, rather than merely the CIall y gran ted , Accordmg to the second major tenet of feminism, however, reali ty is guite otherwise: 2, Women and men are not currently social and political equals, Gender inequ:Ji:S eXISts, 111 most If not all societies, and this inequality systematically cli sadvanl g women ,
Tak~n together, tenets 1, and 2 ~ortray a d~sconnect belween an enduring Ill:rf~ realIty and a se t of pre,vaIllllg SOCial and political circ umstances: a group of pe ~h' that IS I,n fact equal III human dlgmty ,and worth is not being h'ea ted as su Recoglllzlllg tl1lS disconnec t naturally Yields the conclusion that:
3, Cencier inequali ty is unjust and should be ended,
• Distinguishing Feminists from Nonfeminists
Ol:e virtue of th' e conception of fel~inism just outlined is that it helps u S ?i,st~~ glllsh femllllsts from nonfemlllists III ways that are both helpful and intultl V Y plausible. In particular, it enables us to ee that fem ini sm requires the acceptance of both claims 1 and 2 and the consequen t recognition (as in claim 3) of prevailing conditions as unjust.
. It is common to mistake the acceptance of tenet 1 alone for fem inism, that IS, to think that feminism is simply a matter of believing in the inherent equality of men and women. The belief that women are just as worthy and competent as men, and that they are thus entitled to equality, is certainly important and valuable; however, it does not yet arti culate a feminist position. For if one also believes that men and women are now socially and politicall y equal-for instance, that women have fully overcome any disadvantages or obstacles that may have Impeded them in th e past and now enj oy the equality that they deserve-then One's pos ition is not feminist. Feminism is an oppos iti onal and criti cal politics, to whi ch the recognition of curren t injusti ce is essential. It is for this reason that feminism's aim is to make itself obsolete. It is also poss ible (although less easily mistaken for feminism) to accep t claim 2 without accepting claim 1. Fo r instance, one might beli eve that gender inequalIty ex ists and that it disadvantages women but that because women are naturally l11ferior to men, that is, are not men's rational an d moral equa ls, the social inequalIty between men an d women is just, fair, and appropriate. Thus proponents of tl~ls position wi ll, in light of their rejection of claim 1, also reject claim 3. (It is cIifficult, these days, to get away with openly arti culating this position, at least in mixed company. As a result, we see individuals and organizations publicly defendI11g positions of dubious coherence: the Southern Baptist Conference, for exa mpl e, recently asserted that women should submit to their husbands' leadership and refrain from preaching in public, wh il e in th e sa me breath declaring that men and women are "equal."2) . Finally, note that one could accept that systema ti c and unjust gender in equalIty curren tly ex ists, but hold that it is men rather than women who are disa dvantaged by it. This position is advanced by many proponents of the "men's rights" Or "masculist" movement.
• WHY FEMINISM?
Although there are certainly those who reject claim 1, many debates and misll~derstandings between feminists and nonfeminists concern the acceptance or rejection of claim 2, that is, of the claim that women now lack social and political equality. Some people deny claim 2 outright; many others contend that, although women in many areas of the world are still seri ously disadvantaged, wOmen in the United States and other Western industrial democracies have succeeded in gaining equali ty. Although it is not my primary task to defend the truth of th e core feminist tenets above, offering some support for tenet 2 wi ll aid further discus ion by clar-
Ifying Some of what is at issue. To this end, let me disc uss just t\,yo important areas
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Reflections on Philosophy in whi ch women (including U.S. wo men ) a re n ow seri ously di sadvan taged by gend er inequality: the areas of work and of vuln erability to violence.
• Women's Work: Separate and Unequal
Yo u may have heard it sa id before that wo m en tend to receive less mon ey for doing th e sam e work as men and that wo men face a form of discrimin ati on in prom oti on known as the "glass ceiling." T hese cla ims are true and important, but far more significant in affec ting masses of wo m en is what we might call th e "s ticky floor" -th e fact that in almost any fi eld , women line th e bottom. Women fa ce segregation into low-paying and low-prestige "women's work" -largely service occ upati ons such as clerical support, nursing, teaching, home h ealth , day ca re, and elder care. T hat there are many excepti ons to this rul e, and that the segrega ti on is no t legally enforced, does n ot alter its detrim ental effec ts on th e lives of most wom en. T his means th at ge tting less money for th e sa me work is, although important, th e leas t of most wom en 's probl ems because, in m ost cases, women are not doing the sam e wo rk as men, and th e work that they do is undervalued and und erpaid because th ey are wo men. Jobs requiring simil ar levels of edu cation and training are valued and rewa rded differently depending on whe th e r th ey are pe rformed primaril y by m en or primarily by wom en. 3 The issue is not so much wheth er a female child-care wo rker or construction worker m akes as much as a male childca re worker or cons truction worker but, instea d, why most child-care workers are fem ale and m ost constructi on workers male and why construction wo rkers make m ore money th an chi ld-care workers do.
Finally, wheth er or not wo men work outsid e th e hom e fo r pay, they continue to bear a disproportionate responsibili ty for domesti c labor -the maintenance of households and th e ca re of childre n, eld ers, and oth er dep endents. Al though recent decades have seen som e in crease in men's participation in these duti es, th e inc rease is substantially less than one might h ope, and th e tim e wo men spend on such labor (aga in, even when they also work outsid e th e home) still far exceeds that spent by m en . T his has led some feminists to refer to wom en's dom esti c labor as th e "second shift."4 T his labor, of course, is not paid at all, and too often is not even recognized as real wo rk, especially when it is done by poor wo m en receiving governm ent assistance. Such u npaid labor by wom en (or ind eed by anyo ne) is not counted as part of any country's gross domestic product, thus resulti ng in dangerously skewed portrayals of economi c reali ty.5
• Violence and Terror in Women's Lives
Most of us, from time to time, have heard recitals of grim and shocking sta tistics abou t th e incidence of rape, batteri ng, sexual harassment, and other for ms of sexual violen ce and exploitati on in the lives of wom en and girls. Tha t th ese sta-tistics vary in their details should not blind us to their underlying agreement: that male violence against women is both exceedingly common and drama tically underreported. We know, fo r instance, that wo men and girls are raped in all kinds of circumstances-by dates, by husbands and boyfriends, by fathers and stepfathers, by bosses and coworkers, as well as (less frequently) by men who are strangers to th em. In a recent survey of 16,000 Americans, jointly sponsored by the National Institute of Justi ce and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 18 percent of women repo rted having been victims of rape or attempted rape at some poin t in their lives 6 G irls and yo ung women are especially vulnerable to sexual assault: th e sa me study showed th at 54 percent of rape victims were under th e age of eighteen when they were first raped. Among women who had been raped or phys ically assa ulted after th e age of eighteen, 76 percent were attacked by a curren t or form er husband, cohabiting partner, or date. Fi nally, it is important to remember that many women suffer multiple in ciden ts of sexual violence during their lives : among women who reported having been raped within the twelve months prior to th e survey, the average number of rapes per woman during that twelve-month period was 2.9.
Thirty yea rs of feminist critique and activism have brought about important an d necessary changes in the law, in preva iling attitudes toward thesc ab uses, and in th e services available to their victims. It is important to remember, however, that the primary feminist aim in this area is to reduce the actual incidence of these abuses, and ultimately to end them entirely. The goal of feminism is to bring about equality, and equality requires that this damaging and discriminatory burden in the lives of women be removed, not m erely that more of its perpetrators be punished or its victims treated better in th e afterm ath. Unfortunately, no evidence shows that wo men and gi rls are being raped, ba ttered, and sexually harassed any less frequently now than ten or thirty yea rs ago; the devastation wrought in wom en's lives by th ese abuses continues unabated.
One might rea onably wonder wh ether these abuses of women are correctly thought of as an element of gend er in equality; as terrible as they are (one might say), they do not affect all women, but only those who are th eir victims. Feminists have argued, however, that thi s compl ex amalgam of abuses harms all wo men and girls in our culture. This is so in a number of ways; I'll discuss just one, nam ely, th at women and girls live their daily lives in fear of violence. We are taught that male violence against women is a natural and in evitable feature of the social environment and that women can avoid such violence only by controlling th eir own behavior in certain rigidly specified ways.7 The result is that women have less freedom than do men: to walk alone at night, to go on dates without fear of assa ult, to drink a bit too much at a party, to work late in a deserted office~ to dress as they please, to drive across th e country alone, and to sleep with the wlI1dow open, to nam e just a few. Although no law forbids these actions, our culture teach es that women who do such things put themselves in danger. Too ~ften, the implication is that any subsequ ent attacks on them are their own fault:
What was sh e doing there, anyway?"
• The Concept of Oppression
T he fea tures of women's lives just described are among m any that provide evidence for claim 2 above-th at women are not currently the social and political equals of men. Far from being aridly legalistic, claim 2 addresses matters close to the center of our lives as men and as women: what work we do, wha t burdens we must bear, what dangers we face inside and outside our key relationships, and what resources are ava ilabl e to us to lead th e lives that we wa nt to lead . Furthermore, th ese matters involve some of our most fundamental rights as human beings: the ri ght to bodily safety and integrity, the right to freedom of movement and freedom from terror, the right to work, and th e right to the resources necessary to ma intain a decent life for oneself and one's depend ents.
To a id in understanding of these matters, feminists have employed a concept that has been important in liberation movements of many kinds: th e con cept of oppression. Our claim has been that women are an oppressed group. Although the con cept of oppression has been defined in different ways, most th eorists agree that oppress ion is much more than the sum of inten tional acts of discrimina tion by bigoted individuals. According to Marilyn Frye's influ en tial definition, oppression is a "system of interrelated barri ers and forc es wh ich reduce, immobilize, and mold people who b elong to a certain group, and effec t th eir subordination to another group."s Because of the complex and systemati c nature of wom en's oppression, its roots an d consequences, like those of other forms of oppression, are not always imm ediately apparent. Instead, elem ents of gend er oppression li e buried in many of our least qu estioned assumptions about our lives and in many of our most widely accepted practices. According to som e femin ists, such elements also lie buried, and som etim es not so buried , in the assumptions and practices of philosophical ethi cs.
• ANDROCENTRISM IN PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS
T h e field of academ ic philosophy, histori cally male dominated, has in recent decades seen an influx of more women into its ranks. It has becom e apparent to many such wom en (a nd to a number of m ale philosophers as well ) that mu c h of th e hi story of philosophy, including that of philosophical ethi cs, is m ale biased, or androcen tric. Why thi s would be so is not difficult to und erstand. T he wo rks constituting that history were written almost entirely by m en -mostl y privileged and powerful ones, although not without exception-during historical periods when educa tion , freedom of movement, and the production of cultural an d intellec tual work were largely off-limits for wom en.
This point, although n eith er mysterious nor especially complex, is enormously important. It reveals that, however tempting it may be to view th e history of philosophy as the con tinuing effort of human beings to understand them selves and their place in the universe, this history is in fact almost entirely the effort of (again, mostly privileged) men to understand th emselves and their place in the universe. Following are several ways in whi ch thi s androcentrism has expressed itself in the history of philosophical ethi cs.
• Female Invisibility
Perhaps th e mos t pervas ive express ion of androcentrism in philosophical ethics h as been its tendency to ignore wo men outright. Whatever the generi c uses of th e pronoun "he" may or may not be in contemporary discourse, for the auth ors of most hi stori cal wo rks of phil osophy "he" meant exac tl y what it sa id: th e moral agen t, th e h ero , the soldier, th e citi zen , th e man of virtue, are all explicitly and unself-consciously con ceived as male. In these texts, for the m ost part, moral deliberation is some thing that takes place within th e minds or souls of individual m ales, and communal moral life is th e life that m en lead in the compa ny of oth er m en. For this reason , female stud ents reading th ese undeniably important wo rks often find that th ey h ave to try to "read them selves into" the texts; given the texts' frequent omission of women's very existence, let alon e of wo men's perspec tives or rol es in th e moral communi ty, this is not always an easy thing to do. T his form of androcentrism , while clea rl y a product of wom en's oppress ion, also contributes to th at oppression by conveying that th e lives, concerns, and choices of women are so unimportan t as to be beneath menti on.
• Overt M isogyny
Wh ere wom en have come to the a ttention of ethical phil osophers, that attenti on has usuall y been unfavo rabl e: wo men have often been th e ob jects of overt misogyny. (Notabl e excepti ons to this rul e include Plato [427-347 B. c .J -at least in The Republic-a nd, centuri es later, the strongly feminist John Stuart M ill [1806-1873:1-) From sid e comments to extended analyses, wha t phil osoph ers have h ad to say on th e subj ec t of women -concerning th eir nature, valu e, and proper roles-has by and large ranged from mocking to vi cious.
Aristotl e (384-322 B.C.) and Ka nt (1724-1804), arguably the two grea test e thi cal th eorists in th e history of philosophy, are particularl y notorious for their sexism . (I will have more to say about Kant shortly.) Feminist philosoph er Cynthia Freeland h elpfully summarizes some of Aristotle's views on the subj ect of wom en : "Aristotl e says that th e courage of a man lies in commanding, a wom an 's lies in obeying; that 'matter yearns for form , as th e femal e for th e male and the ugly for the beautiful' ... that a female is an in compl ete mal e or 'as it were, a deformi ty', whi ch contributes only matter and not form to th e generation of offspring; th at in general 'a wom an is perh aps an inferior being' ; tl1at femal e charac ters in a tragedy will be inappropriate if they are too brave or too clever."g To Aristotle, th e conclusion was clea r: "the male is by nature superior, and the fem ale inferi or; and the on e rul es, and th e other is rul ed; this principl e, of necessity, extends to all mankin d."lo Once we notice invisibility and expressions of misogyny in the history of ethics, it is possible to respond in various ways. One response is to ask whether such authors as Aristotle and Kant can be legitimately blamed for their attitudes toward women and for the expression of those attitudes in their philosophical works, that is, whether given their historical and cultural circumstances, they could and should have done better.)) Although this is a worth while line of inquiry, feminist philosophers have typically been more interested in whether and how these authors' misogyny relates to other elements of their own theories and (relatedly) in whether that misogyny has filtered down through th e tradition to be picked up and reflected in some of our con temporary moral assumptions, theories, and practices.
An optimisti c response to these questions, while acknowl edging that it is wrong to exclude or vilify women, would contend that th ese features of historical texts do not bear on the overall value or truth of the theories they present. That is, one might say that although th ese authors should have included women in their theories on equal terms with men, their failure to do so does not bear on the fundamental worth of th eir theori es. According to thi s approach, we should simply ignore th ese theorists' false beliefs about women, .read their th eories as if they had meant them to apply to women too, and evaluate other elements of their views independently of their misogynist beliefs and assumptions.
There is certainly something to this approach. That a th eorist expresses contempt for women does not invalidate his views on a wide range of subj ects, and we benefit from studying th e works of undeniably great ethi cal philosophers such as Kant and Aristotle regardl ess of their opinions about women. T he assumption that their misogyny has no bearing on th e rest of th eir th eories, however, is open to qu estion. There is at least one important way in which female invisibility and misogyny combine to underwrite some fundamental and continuing assumptions in the history of ethics.
• The Male Standard in Ethical Theory
One central task of ethical theory is to articulate and defend a human ideal, that is, to identify the defining features of an ideally good human life. It is in contrast to this ideal, or standard, that deviations or failures can be recognized as such. As we pursue the task of defining such an id eal, however-as with most tasks of any importance-various forms of bias and blindness tend to infect our perceptions. With this in mind, many feminist philosophers have charged tha t what passes for a human ideal in much of standard philosophi cal ethics is in fact a male ideal.
Imagine opening a medical textbook and seeing, under th e heading "The Human Body," a drawing of th e body of an adult male. When you ask where yoU might find a drawing and explanation of female anatomy, you are told that yOLl need a different book, for this information is to be found in a special subdisciplin e of medicine, that of obstetrics/gynecology. Nothing negative has been said about women; the message is simply that the male body "stands in" for the human body unmodified, and the fe male body is special and different -different, that is, from the standard set by the male body.
Something qu ite similar can occur in ethical th eory and , according to feminist ethicists, freq uently has. The tendency is to look at men to see how they approach moral life: what they see as ethically relevant decisions, how they make those decisions, and what they think is involved in making th ose dec isions well. (Recall, aga in, that men have historically been not only the obj ects of such inquiry In t also its subjects-the ones doing the inquiring, often including introspectively inqui ring into th eir own psyches.) What is observed of men, or cons idered to be ideal fo r men, is then elevated to be the standard for human beings in general: "man" comes to stand in for "moral agent" and "good man" for "good person," in much th e way that th e male body stands in for th e human body in the earli er e:cample. Men are taken as th e paradigm of humani ty, and a male point of view is disgu ised as a universal or obj ective point of view. As Su an Sherwin puts it, ",nen have constructed ethics in their own psychol ogica l image." 1 2 Aga in, nothing nega tive has yet been sa id about women, at least not expli citly. In fact, however, invisibility and misogyny have already made their appearance: wh en women's experiences, perspectives, and prac tices are considered irreleva nt to the task of defining a human ideal, the assumptio n that women are inferi or and uni mportant is already firml y in place. T his assumption is then reinfo rced when, with our "human" (male) standard in hand , wc eventually do look a: women and fi nd that th ey differ from that standard .
We all know that men and women differ anatomi cally. However, when a male slanda rd of hu man anatomy is in place, it is hardly surprising that various aspec ts of fema le bi ology come to be pathologized, that is, treated as devian t, problema:ic, and indi cative of sickness and malfun ction. Many health care profess ionals of both sexes have made valiant efforts to combat this tendency, but the male standard is still influential in our society's medical treatment of women: our medical e;tabli shm ent markets powerful antidepressa nt drugs to women with premenslrual symptoms, trea ts childbirth as a dangerous process routin ely requiring edensive technological intervention, and pressures postmenopausal women in to taking hormones fo r th e rest of their lives. 13
A male standard in ethical theory has similar implications. Aga in, to the edent that women are thought to deviate from the standard set by men, women are judged to be defective. We can see this pattern most cl early, aga in, by looking to a historical example. Kant famously argued that moral duties are "categorical," that is, binding on us irrespective of what we happen to desire. He also argued that one's acti ons have no true moral worth unless th ey are perform ed "from the nlOtive of du ty," tha t is, unless one does the right thing not because one wants to, but beca use one recognizes that a universally applicabl e moral principle (the ca tegori cal imperative) requires it.
14 In this context, consider Kant's views on th e nature and capaciti es of women: "Women will avoid the wicked not because it is unright, but only because it is ugly .. . nothing of duty, nothi ng of compulsion, noth ing of obliga tion! . . . They do something only because it pleases them .. . I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles."1 5 According to Kant, then, the ve ry form of thought and action that constitutes moral life itself is a form of which women are incapable.
It is important for us to understand what h as happen ed h ere (and in many structurally similar cases) . It could be one of two things. Kant might have determined on independent grounds that a certain form of thought and action is constitutive of moral life and then discovered that, as a matter of empirical fact, women are not capable of that form of thought and action. Alternatively, he might have assumed from the outset that whatever it is women do and think is by definition not a part of morality proper. According to the second interpretation, the assumpti on abou t wom en comes first, and the conception of morality is built aro und it; women are locked out of this moral framework not simply empirically but also con ceptually and a priori.
It is difficult to say which of these interpretations is closer to the truth. Most likely, Kant's beliefs about th e nature of wo m en developed as part of a cornplex interpl ay with his beli efs about the nature of morality. The cen tral task for feminist ethicists, however, is not so much to discern what went on in Kant's h ead but instcad, to investigate wh eth er and how some forms of moral th eory may hav~ shut women ou t conceptually (instead of, or in addition to, shutting thern out emp irically) an d, if so, how such con ceptual error affects th ese theories' concl usions. We need to take seriously the possibility that male bias can lead us into error not simply about women (although such error is important in its own right) but also about morality itself.
• Implications of the Male Standard
A theory that adopts a male standard says essentially this: women and mell.
. . . are different, and manhood IS the standard or Ideal from which WOmen deviate. A frequent corollary of such a theory is that th ere are in fact. separate and distinct Ideals, or vlltues, appropna te for men and women respectively. Aga in, Arist tl provides an illustration: h e believed th at th e virtues of free m en are those a 0 e priate to full citi zenship and political activity, while those of "free" (that I' ppro, for behavior that would be deemed admirably assertive in a man, while a man may be derided as wimpy, weak, or "woman ish" when he expresses vuln erability In a way that would be seen as natural or appropriate in a woman. Whenever Such double standards are applicd , their inh erent gender bias must be examined and criticized.
The consequences for women of a male-biased standard, however, have an additional and extrem ely important dimension. Whenever th ere are differen t Ideals for men and women, and the male id eal is taken to be the paradigm of humanity itself, th e result for women is a pervasive and damaging double bind. 16 As mentioned above, to the extent that a woman approximates the male standard, she is defective as a woman : insuffi ciently fem inin e, mannish , a freak, a bitch. Granted, she can be judged a "good woman" by conforming fully to the female standard, that is, to norms of femininity. We must rem ember, however, that on this model, womanhood itself is a defective, lesser form of human ity. It thus appears that, whenever a mal e standard is in place, a woman can be either an ideally good woman or an ideally good person-but not both.
• The Male Standard, Revised and Updated
It is worth briefly noting two ways in which one might modify the picture that I've drawn so far. F irst, one mi ght claim that women really are just like men after all, that is, that wo men do conform to the male sta ndard and that any suggestion to th e contrary is a wholly unfounded stereotype. Alternatively, one might argue that, although wo men have by and large fall en short of the male standard, this hortfall is owing not to women's nature but to the unjust constraints that have been placed on women's development and activities. For instance, one might say, if attention to abstract prin ciples were as encouraged and rewarded in women as in men, then women would in fact draw closer to this aspec t of the human id eal. These views arc certainly improvemen ts, in that neither depicts women as naturall y and irredeemabl y defec tive. They do, however, leave in place the substance of th e standard previously deemed male. That is, the qualities previously thought appropriate for men are now thought to be th e qualities appropriate for human s in general. It may be, however, that in adopting this standard as the human ideal, we risk losing or disregarding some thing of great value. Many feminists have argued, in fact, that it is th e substance of the male standard that is limited and biased, not merely the assumption that only men can or should embody that standard .
• FEMININE ETHICS: CHALLENGING

ANDROCENTRlSM
Challenging androcentri sm in philosophi cal ethics requires that we bring women fully into the picture-and that we do so without th e inherently misogynist assumption that maleness sets the standard for humanity. That is, ethical theorizing must be undertaken in full recognition of core feminist tenet 1 above: that women and men are moral and rational equals. Incorporating tenet 1 requires that we take women seriously as moral agents: how do women understand themselves, perceive the world, and think about moral questions? What do women think is important and valuable in human life? Philosophical ethics must embody and express respect for women as human equals by devoting attention to and understanding women's points of view. The next question, of course, is "What are women's points of view?" And the answer, of course, is that they are many and diverse-there is no single "female" or "feminine" way of thinking (about morality or anything else), let alone any single set of be1iefs and values embraced by all women. But it has seemed to many people (feminist, nonfeminist, and antifeminist alike) that there are-at least within particular cultures, if not across them -some very general patterns of divergence between the moral perspectives of men and women. (After all, if no such gendered differences exist, then the male standard in ethical theory will be of Ii ttle practical consequence.)
The first central claim of "feminine ethics," then, is an empiri cal one: that the typical or predominant moral perspectives of women and m en, respectively, are different. (A weaker version of this claim would be that, given the historical tendency to ignore and vilify women, it is at least necessary to investigate whether such a difference exists and, if so, what it means.) This empirical claim can be, and has been, assessed in different ways, both through formal research (most often conducted by psychologists) and by the kind of careful and attentive reflection on our own social experience by which we evaluate empirical claims of many kinds.
The second claim central to feminine ethics is a normative one: that women's differences from men in the moral realm-whatever and however extensive these differences may be-should not be assumed to b e deficiencies, any more than men's differences from women should be assumed to be deficiencies. Within the historical context that I've outlined, this claim is revolutionary, for it upsets the basic assumption of the male as standard. In recent decades, this conceptual shift away from taking the male as standard has reverberated across many academic fields, not to mention within the personal lives of many women and men.
• Gilligan's Ethics of Care
Much philosophical work in feminine ethics has been inspired and influenced by the research of Carol Gilligan. Although Gilligan is an educational psychologist, not a philosopher, her observations about patterns of difference between male and female ethical styles (or "voices") have contributed much to philosophers' efforts to begin taking women's moral perception and reasoning seriously. 17 Gilligan began developing her distinctive research program during the 1970s, largely ~s an outgrowth of and response to h er work with Lawrence Kohlberg, another infl uential psychological researcher. On th e bas is of his own studies, Kohlberg had outlined six distinct "stages" of moral development through whi ch people pass in their (often incomplete) journeys to moral maturityI8 The idea is that, at each successive stage, one has different (and better) sorts of reasons for conforming to moral constraints as one understands them. Kohlberg's stages are as follows:
Stage 1: Punishment and Reward. For instance, a child refrains from hitting her little broth er to avoid a "ti me-out" or to get a cookie. Stage 2: Limited Reciprocity. A child shares his own toys in hopes that his playmate will share hers with him. Stage 3: Social Approval. A teenager behaves according to prevailing norms so that others will approve of her. This is sometimes called the "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Stage 4: Law and Order. A person behaves out of a sense of du ty to respect authority and main tain the prevailing social order-and out of an accompanying desire to be respected as an upstanding member of society.
Stage 5: Social Contract. Here one conforms to sociely's rules in the belief that those rules regulate people's behavior in ways that allow each to pursue his own interests wi thout undue interference from others, thus benefiting each in the long run. Stage 6: Universal Principles . Here one understands and assesses one's own behavior by reference to universal ethical principles (such as justice, reciprocity, equality, and respect) that are thought of as self-legislated and as independent of the moral codes of one's own (or any) particular society.
Using this scale, Kohlberg set out to assess th e level of moral development of his research ubj ects. In his interviews, Kohlberg asked people to respond to a series of fi ctional moral dilemmas. One of these dil emmas, later used by Gilligan in one of her studi es, is now famously known as the Heinz dilemma. The story goes like thi s: Heinz's wife is dying, and her life can be saved only by administering a certain very expensive drug, which Heinz cannot afford to buy. The druggist, although aware of th e situation's urgency, refuses to lower the price of th e drug. Respondents were asked what Heinz should do und er the circumstances-for instance, whether he should steal th e drug -and why. Their level of !noral development was assessed on the basis not of what answer th ey gave, but of what kinds of reasons and considerations they brought to bear in favor of their answer.
Using his six-stage scale, Kohlberg assessed tl1e moral development of many people from variolls cultures, nations, races, and walks of life. All of his initial subjects, however, had one characteristic in common: they were all male. Furthermore, when Kohlberg's instrument was eventually administered to femal es, the results were striking: females tended to score a full level lower on Kohlberg's scale than did their male counterparts. This was partly because fem ale respondents tended to look for solutions to Heinz's dilemma that would pre erve connections betwecn the various parties. For instance, some sugge ted that Heinz and th e druggist keep negotiating and agree on a payment plan. O n e yo ung girl pointed out that if Heinz were to steal the drug, then h e might go to jail, and th en wh at if his wife needed more of the drug later? In light of this worry, she concluded that Heinz and his wife "sh ould really just talk it out and find some other way to make the m on ey. "19 Note that this yo ung girl's response resists a simple either-or solution and also avoids a strict priority ranking of the relevant values (for instan ce, of life over m oney or of one person 's ri ghts over another's) . Instead, she emphasizes that this particular event takes place within a nenvork of relationships that extends over tim e, and she seems to put high est priority on m aintaining those relationships and trying to get peopl e's needs m et within th em . Such a response is difficult to assess using Kohlberg's scale. T h e temptation , however, is to place answers like this at stage three, that is, to see th em as concerned with approval and with being a "good girl." T hus it was that, wh en Kohlberg's scale was appli ed, many female respondents appeared to be "stuck" at stage three, wh ile many males ascended to stages four and five .
T h e gend er differen ce in these re ults seemed to indi cate one of two things: either females are less m orally developed th an males or th ere is something skewed abou t th e standards that Kohlberg was using to measure m oral developm ent. As we n ow know, th e form er is a historically famili ar idea . G ill igan , properl y wa ry of its implica ti ons, und ertook h er own research and interviewed both males and females about th eir responses to e thical dilemmas (both real and imagin ed).
Based on this resea rch, she argued that there are two distinct moral "voices," or ways of th inking about and responding to ethical questions, loosely assoc iated with wo men and m en respec tively. G illigan called th ese the ethi cs of care (or responsibil ity) and the ethics of justi ce (or rights).
T hese tvo m oral voices differ in their core th emes and values and in the kinds of considerations that they take to be m ost relevant to reachi ng good moral decisions. T h e justice perspecti ve begins with a conception of persons as separate individuals. T hese separate individuals need comm on rules to govern their interactions with each other; a primary function of these rules is to safeguard a realm of autonomy within which each individual may operate without undue interfe ren ce from others. Thus, central to this perspective is the notion of individual rights, which are the same for everyone and must be respected fa irly and im partially. M oral decision making is a matter of adjudicating conflicts betveen rights and of seeing to it that one's actions conform to abstract and unive rsal codes of conduct. According to Gilligan, the justice perspective is more prominent in the moral voices of males than in those of females .
The care perspective, in contrast, begins with a conception of persons as embedded in social relationships, in which they bear different and som etimes conflicting responsibilities to each other. Here, the priority is on creating and preserving such connections between people and on avoiding and ending people's suffe ring. One's duty is to care about and promote people's well-being, and one's responsibility is to respond to the n eeds of individuals located in concrete, par-
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Many have fou nd Gilligan's picture intuitively plausible, at least in its broad outlines. It seems to describe a difference that we can see operating in our own social experience as (and among) women and men. Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine why there might be substantial differences between men's and women's moral perspectives. For men and women, by and large, lead different kinds of lives.
• Gendered Responsibilities
Whether or not women and men are naturally or inevitably different, what is certain is that women and men encounter the social world differently. This is because that world is structured by a gendered division oflabor, in wh ich women and men are assigned different responsibilities. As Marilyn Friedman puts it, "the tasks of govern ing, regulating social order, and managing other 'public' institutions have been monopolized by men as their privileged domain, and th e tasks of susta ining privatized personal relationships have been imposed on, or left to, women."zo More concretely, women are assigned responsibility for the care of homes, children, and people's intimate emotional and physical needs (s uch as nurturance, food, cleanliness, clothing, and the like). Even wh ere women work outside th e home for pay, as is common in contemporary U.S. culture, we can see the influence of this traditional division of labor: women are overrepresented in fields such as nursing, day care, elementary educa tion , maid service, and food service. Both inside and outside the home, tending to the intimate needs of oth ers tends to be, both in cultural conception and in actual fact, "women's work." The gendered division of labor is more rigid in some cultures and time periods than in others; furthermore, there is some cross-cultural variance in what the gender-specific roles and responsibilities are. Nonetheless, that people's assigned activiti es differ by gender is far less variant. One gender-specific responsibili ty that has drawn the atten tion of a number of philosophers interested in women's moral lives is that of mothering. Having primary responsibility for the Intimate care and nurturing of children seems likely to shape women's moral perspectives in especially deep and pervasive ways.
In any case, it seems plausible to suppose that people's ways of thinking are shaped significantly by what they spend their time doing, with and for whom, governed by what norms and expectations, and so on. Thus, it should not surprise Us if men's and women's approaches to many things, including moral reasoning, turn out to be different. Whether or not a particular gendered division of labor is appropriate, necessary, or just, the patterns of moral reasoning and response that emerge from and support women's labor are important and complex. Understanding and evaluating th ese patterns is crucial to a full und erstanding of moralIty and is the primary aim of feminine ethics.
• THREE CHALLENGES TO FEMININE ETHICS
It is a m easure of the importance of Gilligan's work that it has been challenged in a number of way£ that can deepen our understanding of the issues it raises. We can imagine feminine ethics being criticized from at least three different .Fet"-spectives . T he first is that of the social scientist, whose primary concern IS to \ describe the social world correctly and to interpret correctly what we observe of that world . The second critical perspective is th at of the moral philosopher, whose concerns are (among others) to understand correctly the theoretical tradition of are reasonable, complete, and useful. The third perspective is that of th e ferniwhich h e or she is a part and to develop theoretical approaches to morali ty that \ nist, whose aim is to understand a system of gender-based oppression in orde~ to undermine that system and replace it with som ething better. Although separating these three sets of concerns is useful for organizing our thoughts on th e matte!", a full y adequate approach to the relevant issues must take into account the insigh t5 drawn from all three critical perspectives.
• Empirical Complications
From an empirical point of view, one obvious question is whether Gilligan 1s correct to associate the justi.ce and care perspectives in any significant way with gender. A number of questions have been raised about Gilligan's empirical :;Ittributions of th ese two moral "voices" to m en and women, respectively. Gilligan herself has repeatedly emphasized that the connections she dra.vvs to gender are loose and admit of many exceptions; h er position has never been that all women employ only the care perspective and all men only the justice perspective. Many peopl e show some fluency in both "voices." Interestingly, h owever, Gilligan's research suggests that women are more likely to be ethically bili ngtJal in t~is way t~lan are men. As Rosemarie Tong points out, "Gilligan stresses tl,at unlike today s women who speak the moral language of justi ce and rights l1e:;l rly as flu ently as the moral language of care and relationship, today's boys and -c(J-en remain largely unable to articulate their moral Concerns in anything other ttJan the moral language of justice and rights."zl G iven the complexity and multiple layers of people's moral discourse .______let alone of the beliefs, values, and assumptions that underlie that discourse-:i t IS perhaps wise that, in muc~l of h er later work, G illigan has adopted the langv~ge of "focus."zz A person of either gender who is perfec tly capable of understanomg and discussing moral questions from both persI)ectives tl 1 s1 OW a may never le ess ~ preference for, or focus on, one or the other, perhaps som ewhat like being !":ightor left-handed.
Even given these important qualifications how eve [. ~a in .. , . . . ' r, som e concerns eJ-'" about Gilligan s empmcal conclusIOns. I will ment'o . t t l ems. 1 n JUs wo SUC 1 cone First, Gilligan's studies were conducted on a relatively 11 1 l ost oj .
. l b '
sma sca e, anc 11., h er subj ects were peop e Wltl su stanbal educ·~tional "1 1'] ·t. c; rea· c c pnVI ege. lUS, I l'" sonable to wonder to what extent her results, including the gender distribution of moral "voices" that she observed in her research sample, can be extrapolated to the U.S. population as a whole (let alone to humanily in general). In fairness , Cilligan has never claimed that such extrapolation is justified, and she emphasizcs that hcr ma in interest is less in the gender distribution of the "voices" than In the relati on of these voices to each other and in what each brings to our moral consciousness . Still, it will be important for anyone who is interested in the gender distribution to take seriously the limitations of G illigan's research sample. The second empirical concern has to do with the nature of the research rather than the extent of the sampl e . In short, it is one thing to analyze people's self-reported moral perspectives on (mostly) imaginary situations, and another thing to observe how they actually behave in their lives. Although the former kind of inquiry yields interesting information, the latter kind seems at least equally Important to a full understanding of gender differences in morality. We need not criticize G illigan for pursuing one kind rather than th e other, but we can and should seek out other kinds of information about gender differences in moral beli efs and behavior.
DOing so may in turn provide further insight into the nature of th e two perspectives G illigan identified. For instance, many studies have shown a persi tent gender gap in people's attitudes toward war, patriotism, and nationalism; in hort, 111en's nationalistic sentiments, and their enthusiasm for particular wars based on those sen timents, tend to be more fervent and pronounced than women's.23 In one sense, this gen der gap bears out G illigan's view that women tend to adopt more "ca ring" responses-here, supporting negotiation and reconciliation over armed confli ct. This evidence also challenges an aspect of G illigan's view, however, for in this case the typically feminine position displ ays a more universal consciousness, whereas the typically masculine position is more parochial in Its tendency to valorize an d privil ege one's own particular nation.
Such issues of interpretation are just as important to evaluating Gilligan's work as are more stra ightforwardly emp irical questions. Jean Grimshaw, for Instance, has qu estioned whether the justice perspective is inh erently more focused on principle than is the care perspective H It might be, she says, that persons adopting the care perspective are equally "principled," but their principles simply endorse different priority rankings. For instance, rather than seeing a lack of principle in some of the typically feminine responses to the Heinz ~ilemma, we might instead see them as implicitly endorsing a principle like this:
Seek th e preservation of a relati onship over the immediate assertion of your own rights." Carrying out such translations, in both directions, may help assauge the uneasy sense that these two moral perspectives are wholly incommensurable .
• A Bifurcated Moral System?
The last point raises a question that looms large in philosophical discussions of C illigan's work and its implications, namely, once we have recognized these two different perspectives on morality (regardless of their gend er distributi on), what are we to do with them?
One approach is to eleva te one perspective, that is, to endorse one ~s mor~ fundamental, compl ete, and central to a proper understanding of morali ty tha the other. Another approach is to all ow the two perspec tives to stand as separate, an d perhaps to some degree as compe ting, emphases in our moral lives, One version of the latter approach resolves the apparent tension between the two perspectives by assigning them to different spheres of moral life: th e justIce perspective properly governs us in publi c life (governmental and business 1I1ter-actions, for instance), and the ca re perspective is app~opria te for our privat,e ar:r intImate mterac tlOns (as WIth fnends, lovers, and fa mIlies) , Such a bIfurcatIOn ) our moral lives, however, is inadvisabl e, Public pursuits such as internatlOna diplomacy stand to benefit from a foc us on mending and maintaining relatIOnships, and as feminists have tirelessly pointed out, consid erations of justice must be brought to bear even in our most intimate relationships, , A third approach is to try to integrate aspects of both "voi ces" into one u!1lfied
h " ' I I Jltlmoral perspective, t at IS, mto a smg e analyti cal framework within whi c 1 1m pIe goods can be both full y understood and appropriately valu ed, I beli eve that this is a worthy goal, but achi eving it will require articulating carefull y what IS being sought. For the best answer to th e question "Wh at do wom en wa nt ill , 1 moral theory?" (asked by Annette Baier in th e titl e of her well-known artic1 e)25 IS that most women, and most men as well, do not want a moral th eory at all , That is to say, most people neither employ nor seek a moral theory, at least if moral th eory is ,und erstood as a matter of reducing th e compl exity of moral life to; smgle ultImate good or to a smgle pnnclpl e for the regulation of conduct. Instea , what most of us want is, a store of moral concepts that clea rly articulate wha t we value and th at usefull y Illummate th e choices we face, , Many of our moral concepts, as we currently understand them, find theIr natural hom e m one or th e other of the two perspec tives that G illigan observed ~ autonomy an~1 respect 111 the )US~lCe perspective, for instan ce, and compasslOle and empathy m the care perspectIve, Furth ermo re, it is diffi cult to see how thos two perspectives, as they stand, can be integrated, G illiga n expresses this difficul~ m some of her later work, compan ng the shift between the two moral perspec bves to our perception of ambiguous figures (for instance the drawing th at can be seen eith er as a vase or as a hu man face)Z6 For OUI' , 1 ' ts to be ideally mora co ncep ) r useful to us, however, they must be able to take tIle' I I 'de each ot le , Ir p ace a ongsl C I within a single m?ral perspective-th ey must be such that we can see them, anC th e realities they Illummate, full y and clea rly wI'tl1 t f systems and their ideologies. At this analytical juncture, feminin e ethics begins to fall short. '10 help us revise our moral concepts to fit within a unified moral perspective, fe minin e ethics must be integrated into a wider frame of analysisthat provided by feminist ethics, and by feminism more generally.
• What about Oppression?
Despite its admirable focus on taking women's moral perspectives seriously, feminine ethics as such has little to say about oppression. It might, of course, point to historical and contemporary gender inequality in explaining the tendency not to take women seriously, but once a feminine moral perspective is identified, oppress ion ceases to playa cen tral role in th e analysisY Aga in, the emphasis of feminine ethics is on core fem inist tenet I-that women and men are rational and moral equals. A feminist approach, in contrast, incorporates both tenets I and 2-that is to say, it recognizes that women and men are rational and moral equals whose lives are bound up together within an oppressive system of gender lI1equa Ii ty.
Aga in, gender oppress ion (like other forms of oppression) is not just an accumulation of hostile or irrational acts; it is a system that perpetuates itself in many ways, including by inculcating genderecl ideals of what it means to be a "good woman" or a "good man." Whether or not we like this system, we are its creatures; our perspectives and concepts, moral and otherwise, are form ed significantly in conformity with its ideologies and with the roles and re ponsibilities to which it assigns us-roles and responsibilities that are not only different but unequal. Recognizing this fact, and its implications, is necessary if we are to use the actual moral perspectives of women and men as informative bases either for challenging oppression or for developing a fully coherent set of moral concepts.
• FROM FEMININE ETHICS TO FEMINIST ETHICS
Within both the justice perspective and the care perspective lie important conceptual resources for challenging oppression of all kinds. Concepts such as jUstice, equality, autonomy, and respect for individual rights provide a vital basis for feminist and other challenges to entrenched systems of oppression. Such challenges are also motivated and sustained by a desire to alleviate suffering and to promote and preserve valuable human connections. A critical feminist approach , rather than abandoning any of these vital concepts, examines how they become distorted so as to serve rather than undermine an oppressive system.
• Toward Integration: Care, Respect, and Autonomy ~aring labor is vital to sustaining any human society, let alone any worth living
In. We all depend on trusting connections with others to meet our emotional, physical, and spiritual needs, and in evitably the most vulnerable memb;rs 0: society, for instance, chddren and the severely disabled, depend on others car without being able to offer similar care in return. People who routinely perform such cari ng labor must become skilled at perceiving people's needs, attentiv~ly responding to th ose needs, and establishing and preserving th e relationslllPs within which those needs can continu e to be met. These skills are am ong the most worthy and necessary to which hum an beings can aspire.
In oppressive systems, however, the caring labor that su stains individuals and com muniti es is not equally or justl y distributed. Specifically, the oppressed grOUP is typically charged with tending to others' needs, both those of the oppressor group and those of vulnerable dependents. Certainly this has been the pattern In systems of gender oppression.
28 Women's caring skills, then, are the skills of ~i1; oppressed group that has been charged with th e responsibility of serving oth e rs needs from a position oflittle power or authority and whose survival has depended on doing this well.
One conclusion we can draw is that women's facility at caring, although val u- are intimately connected, that indeed, "a closer consideration of respect shows that caring for another is a way of respec ting her." As Dillon observes, "recognizing the connection ben",een care and respect may provide the basis for a more integrative approach to moraJity."3o
To respec t someth ing, Dillon argues, is to recogni ze and respond appropriately to its valu e. Wh at counts as an appropriate response to something's value depends on what th e features of the thing are that make it valuable. Respec t for IJersons as such, then, involves recogni zing and responding appropriately to th e "morally significant fea tures of persons," by which Dillon means "those features that make something a person and make persons things that must morally be taken acco unt of."31 Our und erstanding of respect for persons, then, depends on what fea tures of persons we consider to be morally significa nt.
Dillon contends that the Kantian tradition in moral th eory (th e influence of which looms large in th e justice perspective) has taken an overly limited view of what the morall y significant features of persons are, resulting in a correspondingly hmited understanding of what respect for persons involves. According to the Kantian tradition, the distinctive value of persons lies in a capaci ty that all persons have in common -the capacity to ac t according to principle. 32 As we have seen, the justi ce perspective emphas izes respec ting each person's autonomy, understood a their right to choose and act free from undu e interference.
As Dillon points out, however, other voices-both within the mainstream phil osophical tradition and especially within the newly emerging ethics of care-have emphasized additional fea tures of persons as morally significant. ~mong th ese fea tures are th e foll owing: that persons are specific, concrete, and unrepea table" individuals; that each person has her own way of perceiving and understanding the world and herself; and that each person has needs and wants that she cannot satisfy on her own. Respecting a person, then, involves more than refraining from interfering with her. It also involves responding to her as th e particular indi vidual that she is, attempting to understand and enter into her perspective, perceiving her wants and needs, and trying to address them.
"Care respect" is the so rt of respect that emerges from this broadened conception of the morally significant fea tures of persons. Although Dillon's analysis does not foreground relationship and connection in quite the explicit way that Gilliga n's ca re perspec tive does, it seems clear that care respect for others is best enacted within ongoing relati onships of trust and mutuality. Furthermore, the concept of care respect can also help us to understand how true caring precludes exploi tati on. In short, having care respect for oneself rules out the kind of selfabandonment that is often involved in excess ive and lInreciprocated service to others.13
In redefining caring labor as both respec tful and worthy of respect, we challenge both the tendency to devalue ca ring labor and the closely related tendency to enshrine such labor as culturally feminine. Despite many changes in gender relations in the last few decades, and notwithstanding the existence of notable exceptions, evidence indica tes that men as a group are still largely res istant to joining equally in the everyday labor of intimate ca re for oth e rs, that is, in s~ch tasks as changing diapers, caring for elders, sending gree ting cards, vac uumJDg th e h ouse, and folding th e laundry. Indifferen ce to and in capac ity for such cari n g labor has been a hallmark of male privilege.
Although changing this unfa ir distributi on of labor is no t a task for th eory alone, femin~st. ethics can aga in contribute by redefinin g a con cept tha t (a c f cording to C tlligan) IS central to the moral perspec tives of many men _ that 0 auton om y . . Just as our con ceptions of ca ring may be. distorted in th e servi c~ of oppresS IOn , so too can autonomy be mlsl1l1derstood 111 ways that obscure a. n thus perpetuate oppressive gender relations. Aga in , autonomy within the justICe perspecti ve is often understood as a kind of ideal of elf-suffi cien cy and , relate dly, as ari ght to be "let alon e." T he ideal of autonomy so un;~erstood , h owevcr, mask} a hidden dependence on (often female) canng labor. Such a con ceptio n 0 autonomy is most available to those who depend on the caring labor of others without having to acknowl edge or rec iprocate it. Beginning to value prop e rlY such caring labor will in turn enable us to redefin e au tonomy, both a5 a )1 ideal and as a right, in ways that take full account of human vulnerability a)1d interd epend en ce .
• CONCLUSION
In m y vi ew, feminist ethics subsum es and transforms feminin e e thi cs. Feminist ethi cs is not an ethics embraced by wom en , but an ethics embraced by fem i n ists~ that IS, by persons (female and male) who both value m en and women as equ a l and recogni ze that ge~der oppression c~nrently hinders th eir rela ting as equals. ~ h ave argued that whil e taking women s moral views seriously is an importa)1 first step, we must also take seriously th e oppress ive context within whi ch bot~l wo men and m en develop their moral perspectives and make th cir m oral d ecI~ sions. As Rosemarie Tong puts it, "a feminist approach to ethics asks ( uestiofl :5 about power-that is, about dominati on and subordination _even ~efore It asks qu estions about good and evil , ca re and justice, or maternal and Jaten191 Analyz ing m oral concepts within the context of oppression h elps us be ttef understand both the oppression and th e concept , so that the la tte r m ay be refi ned and the former undermined. We sh ould recast our moral concepts, wh ere nec~ essary, so that th ey do not depend for th eIr meaning and force on tl tual})! I .
. o~ those systems' ideologies-fem inist ethics is, in the end, in separab%e fr:~1 feJ11l' 111St polttt cs .
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• NOTES
